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Plan Colombia is a national program to address Colombia’smajor problems in a highly-coordinated, comprehensivemanner. Plan Colombia contains four central compo-
nents: first, economic recovery, trade, and fiscal issues; second,
strengthening of state institutions; third, national security and
counter-narcotics; and fourth, the Colombian peace process.
Plan Colombia is based upon the realistic assumption that the
only way to finally put an end to the difficult human rights sit-
uation is to negotiate a final peace agreement with the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Lib-
eration Army (ELN) guerrilla movements and to strengthen the
Colombian State. The Colombian State includes the judicial and
legislative branches, as well as the Attorney General’s and the
Prosecutor General’s Offices. In order to accomplish this
agenda, Colombia must confront
the drug trade head-on by destroying
the drug-traffickers’ infrastructure,
thereby disrupting the enormous
amounts of money fueling armed
illegal group activity in Colombia.
This is why Plan Colombia has a mil-
itary component.
In order to adequately discuss
Plan Colombia and the U.S. aid pack-
age, one first must understand the
situation in Colombia. I have learned
that it is very easy to reach the wrong
conclusions about Colombia when
you lack crucial information. 
The first thing I must say is that
Colombia is not experiencing a civil war where half the popu-
lation is fighting the other half. Rather, the situation in Colom-
bia is an internal conflict generated by approximately 30,000
individuals (less than 0.06 percent of the country’s population
of 39.6 million), consisting of both guerrilla organizations and
illegal self-defense groups. These groups are totally alienated
from mainstream Colombian society. In all public opinion polls
done by private, independent pollsters in Colombia, including
several polls done by international institutions, it is very clear
that the population of Colombia does not support the guerril-
las, or consider them legitimate. Although numbers vary, close
to 88 percent of Colombians have a negative opinion of the guer-
rillas (only 4 percent have a positive opinion). Colombians do
not support the illegal self-defense groups either. Furthermore,
these groups are well armed, well trained, and most impor-
tantly, well financed. The resources for these groups stem from
the fact that they “tax” the illegal drug trafficking industry in
remote areas of the country in exchange for protection from gov-
ernment law enforcement. 
The country has such a difficult human rights situation pre-
cisely because these guerrillas and illegal self-defense groups have
demonstrated a flagrant disregard for human rights and inter-
national humanitarian law. Neither my government nor the
United States government, nor human rights non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) dispute that the vast majority of all inci-
dents of human rights violations, as well as violations of inter-
national humanitarian law, are attributable to these groups.
Since coming to office in August 1998, President Andrés Pas-
trana has placed the issue of human rights at the very forefront
of his agenda. He has continually stated, in the clearest possi-
ble terms, that he will not tolerate
human rights abuses. At a Colom-
bian Mayor’s Conference in Febru-
ary 2000, President Pastrana stated,
“my government and I are fully com-
mitted to the defense of human
rights. Human rights abuses will not
be tolerated, because peace in
Colombia is impossible without the
full application of international
humanitarian law.” He has wel-
comed domestic and international
scrutiny of Colombia’s human rights
policies. For instance, the Office of
the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights operates
under President Pastrana’s permission in Colombia, and her staff
works closely with the government of Colombia. Its members,
as well as all NGOs that visit the country, have government
permission to operate and move freely through any area, and
to verify accusations or incidents of human rights abuses.  Addi-
tionally, the Colombian government regularly cooperates and
provides information to human rights organizations. Colombian
Vice President Gustavo Bell, who is in charge of human rights
issues in the government, meets regularly with representatives
of all human rights NGOs that work in Colombia. Representa-
tives of human rights NGOs sit side-by-side with Colombian
government officials as members of the Committee for Human
Rights Protection, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior.
As one of his first actions in office, President Pastrana
appointed General Fernando Tapias, a reform-minded leader
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dedicated to improving the Colombian military’s record on
human rights, to head the armed forces. Over the last year and
a half, the Colombian armed forces, which includes the Colom-
bian National Police, have made notable, indeed dramatic
improvements. In poll after poll across the country, the armed
forces are continually cited as the most admired government
institution. Complaints against state security forces have
decreased by about 80 percent from 1996 to 1998. The state secu-
rity forces are comprised of the Administrative Department
for Security and the armed forces. Today, only three percent of
all reported human rights violations in the country are attrib-
uted to the armed forces. President Pastrana is determined to
do everything he can to eliminate such incidents entirely. 
In order to reform and professionalize the armed forces,
President Pastrana has taken several steps: he has reformed the
Military Penal Code to include provisions that require an inde-
pendent judge advocate, rather than unit commanders, to judge
subordinates; President Pastrana has prohibited the drafting of
minors under 18 years old; and he has provided the commander
general, who commands the Colombian military, with discre-
tionary power to dismiss servicemen at any time. President Pas-
trana has also instituted a substantial increase in the instruction,
education, and training activities for both commissioned and non-
commissioned officers on human rights and international human-
itarian law; he has established a National Coordination Center,
consisting of the Colombian armed forces and the offices of the
Prosecutor General and the Attorney General, to combat self-
defense organizations; he signed into law, on July 24, 2000, a new
Civil Penal Code in conformity with international humanitarian
law; and he signed the Forced Disappearance Law of 2000 (Ley
de Desaparición Forzada), a measure that criminalized forced dis-
placements, forced disappearances, genocide, and torture. The
Forced Disappearance Law also created a Special Commission,
composed of several state institutions and human rights NGOs,
to locate all victims of forced disappearance in Colombia.
The Colombian State is committed to fighting all criminal
activities in Colombia, including the activity of illegal self-
defense groups. In fact, in 1999, the number of arrest war-
rants, detentions, preventative arrests, and accusatory resolutions
against illegal self-defense group members equaled 1,135 out of
approximately 5,500 members nationwide (20.3 percent of
their total ranks). 
The armed forces have also contributed to the effort against
illegal self-defense groups. Since August 1998, when President
Pastrana came to power, 341 members of illegal self-defense
groups have been killed in action by Colombian armed forces.
By contrast, there were 281 legal measures (arrest warrants,
detentions, preventative arrests, and accusatory resolutions)
against guerrilla members, out of a total population of 25,795
(less than 1 percent of their total ranks). This statistic shows that,
unlike what many NGOs often imply, the Colombian State is not
biased against left-leaning criminal organizations when it comes
to applying the law. The Colombian State has done its best to
bring to justice guerrilla and self-illegal defense groups. The
reality is that Colombia’s justice system is often overwhelmed by
the volume of criminal activity, and it does its best under the cir-
cumstances to punish both the guerrilla and illegal defense
groups that have committed crimes against citizens and the
government. 
The challenges ahead remain enormous. Drug-traffickers are
destroying vast tropical forests in the southeastern part of the
country, mainly in the departments of Putumayo, Caqueta, and
Guaviare. Armed guerrillas and illegal self-defense groups con-
trol this territory and tax the huge coca plantations there.
There is little or no government presence in such regions
because, until recently, the region was a dense, unpopulated jun-
gle. Poor peasants, however, have begun inhabiting this jungle
region in an attempt to make a living by cultivating coca. When
these communities emerged, the guerrillas and illegal self-
defense groups quickly assumed control of the region and
started taxing the drug industry in exchange for “protection”
from counter-narcotics operations. Furthermore, these regions
have no roads, no communications, no health centers, and no
schools. Such factors, combined with the general lawlessness of
these regions and the fighting between guerrillas and illegal self-
defense groups, bring about terrible human rights violations
where innocent civilians are the principal victims. As can be seen,
Colombia’s problems are all interconnected; one problem can-
not be resolved without addressing the others.
President Pastrana’s response to this situation has been to cre-
ate Plan Colombia. Plan Colombia is a U.S.$7.5 billion dollar
initiative, 75 percent of which is comprised of institutional
strengthening, alternative development, and social safety-net pro-
grams, and 25 percent of which is the military, anti-drug com-
ponent. Of the total cost, Colombian taxpayers will pay for
U.S.$4 billion, and international financial institutions will pro-
vide loans for another U.S.$900 million. The Colombian gov-
ernment is seeking foreign assistance for the remaining U.S.$2.6
billion. The U.S. Congress recently approved a U.S.$1.3 billion
assistance package for Plan Colombia. 
The United States Aid Package
Most of the proposed U.S. assistance to the Colombian mil-
itary will be given to two new counter-narcotics battalions.
These battalions will consist of individuals who the Colombian
government and the U.S. State Department, through extensive
background checks and polygraph tests, have carefully vetted
for past human rights abuses. Members of these units will also
receive extensive human rights education and training. Under
safeguards already put in place, no U.S. assistance will be given
to military units suspected of human rights abuses. Some argue
that U.S. assistance to Colombia’s military will worsen the
human rights situation in the country. This assertion is not
true. By strengthening the institutions of the Colombian gov-
ernment, U.S. and all other international aid will enhance the
protection of human rights in Colombia. This is the most impor-
tant point I want to emphasize. 
Some human rights NGOs and other commentators argue
that because there are problems in Colombia, the international
community should refrain from helping, or that because three
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percent of all reported human rights violations still are attrib-
uted to the armed forces, the U.S. aid package, which provides
assistance to the Colombian military, is a bad idea. I believe quite
the contrary; it is precisely because there are problems that we
need help. Colombia alone cannot defeat a U.S.$500 billion
international drug industry or prevent its terrible effects on
Colombia and the whole Andean Region. 
Luckily, I am not the only one who thinks so. The Inde-
pendent Task Force on Colombia (Task Force), a group of
experts formed by the Council on Foreign Relations, and the
Inter-American Dialogue, co-chaired by Senator Bob Graham
of Florida and General Brent Scowcroft, President of the Forum
for International Policy and former national security adviser to
former president George Bush, released a report on October
12, 2000, entitled “Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colom-
bia: Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy.” This report provided
recommendations on U.S. policy towards Colombia. After a
year of analyzing the situation in Colombia, the Task Force
recommended greater U.S. commitment toward Colombia,
including expanding U.S. aid to six years (the recently approved
U.S. aid package is a two-year initiative). The Task Force also rec-
ommended “providing the Colombian [government with the]
capability to protect its citizens . . . by professionalizing its mil-
itary, and expanding aid to all branches of the armed forces.”
They summarized their conclusions by saying “there are risks to
deeper engagement, but these can be held in check. The risks
of not engaging are even greater.”
Of course, U.S. and all foreign aid to Colombia must and will
be supervised by the international community to make sure that
the Colombian State is expanded and strengthened, while also
making it more transparent and responsible. The U.S. Embassy
in Colombia will supervise the implementation and use of all mil-
itary and non-military aid. Most of the institutional strength-
ening, alternative development, and judicial reform projects will
be implemented by Colombian and foreign NGOs, not the
government of Colombia. Each donor country under Plan
Colombia can choose the type of projects that it wishes to fund.
In this sense, the U.S. aid package is generous—of approximately
U.S.$232 million of institution building and alternative devel-
opment resources, the aid package allocates $122 million for sup-
port of human rights and judicial reform. This includes $4 mil-
lion to protect human rights workers with basic measures such
as bodyguards, bullet-proof vests, and armed vehicles. It also
includes $7 million for technical assistance and support for
civil society organizations working in human rights, including
training on how to document human rights violations and
monitor individual cases. The aid package also includes $25 mil-
lion to establish and train new Colombian law enforcement task
forces at the attorney general’s office that will specialize in the
investigation and prosecution of alleged human rights violations.
It is very important that Colombian citizens, the armed forces,
and the international community fully trust our judicial system
so that all accusations against military servicemen are thor-
oughly and justly investigated. To this end, $3.5 million of the
U.S. aid package is specially earmarked for training judges,
and another $2 million for training public defenders.
Regardless of all the negative media attention focused on the
U.S. aid package—aimed mostly toward its military compo-
nent—recent polls show that a vast majority of Colombians
support both the U.S. aid package and Plan Colombia. A Gallup
Poll published on September 2, 2000, by El Tiempo, the largest
newspaper in Colombia, shows that 62 percent of Colombians
are in favor of the U.S. aid package and only 34 percent are
against it. The people of my country know this is our big chance
to solve our many inter-related problems. They understand
that the Colombian armed forces face many challenges, among
them to become a modern and professional fighting force that
respects and upholds international humanitarian law and basic
human rights. Colombians also understand, however, that this
will never happen if we decide not to help them change and sim-
ply walk away. As Ambassador of Colombia, I hope the rest of
the world understands that too. 
* Ambassador Luis Alberto Moreno is the Colombian Ambassador to
the United States, appointed by President Pastrana in 1998.
Colombia alone cannot defeat a U.S.$500
billion international drug industry or
prevent its terrible effects on Colombia
and the whole Andean Region.
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